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Aerial Surveillance By Helicopter
Not Barred By
Fourth Amendment
by Paul J. Marino, Esq. and
Ellen M. Condon, Esq.

A sharply divided United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether helicopter surveillance of a backyard greenhouse from an altitude of 400
feet constitutes a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution requiring a
search warrant. Justice White, in writing
for a four member plurality of the Court,
held that no violation of the fourth amendment occurred ~hen, from their vantage
in a helicopter, police observed marijuana
plants growing in a partially covered
greenhouse.
The case, Florida 'V. Riley, I originated
from a rural area of Pasco County,
Florida, which provided the setting for a
residential mobile home. The Pasco County Sheriffs Office received an anonymous
tip that marijuana plants were growing on
the property which was occupied by
Michael Riley. Unable to observe any contraband from the road, a deputy flew over
the property in a helicopter and circled
twice at 400 feet. Construction of the
greenhouse permitted the deputy to easily
identify marijuana plants inside. The structure, located ten to twenty feet behind the
residence, was casually constructed· of ()paque material. Only two sides of the
greenhouse were enclosed. The other two
sides were completely open, although not
visible from the road or surrounding property. Two full panels, approximately ten
percent of the roof area. were open to view
from above. A wire fence surrounded the
five acres of property and visitors were

greeted with a "DO NOT ENTER" sign
posted at the entrance. The deputy obtained a search warrant for the greenhouse
based upon his visual identification of the
marijuana plants, and, upon its execution,
forty-four marijuana plants were seized.
Riley moved to suppress the evidence on
the ground that the police activity prior to
obtaining a search warrant constituted a
"search" infringing upon his expectation
of privacy in the greenhouse. The trial
judge agreed and granted his motion to
suppress. The State of Florida was successful in its appeal to the Second District
Court of Appeal which reversed the trial
court. 2 However, upon subsequent review,
the Florida Supreme Court reinstated the
trial court's suppression of the evidence. 3
The Florida court found that Riley exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy
entitled to fourth amendment protection
and distinguished Riley from recent
United States Supreme Court decisions
dealing with aerial surveillance.
In one of those cases, California 'V.
Ciraolo, 4 police flew over a residence in a
fixed wing plane at a height of 1,000 feet to
confirm an anonymous tip that marijuana
was growing in the backyard. The
Supreme Court first determined that the
backyard was within the curtilage of the
residence and then focused upon whether
the observation of the curtilage by the
police from the aircraft violated the resident's expectation of privacy. The Court
decided that any expectation of privacy the
occupant might have in his backyard was

not reasonable and not one which society
was prepared to recognize. 5 The surveillance was acceptable where:
The observations ... took place within
public navigable airspace ... in a physically nonintrusive manner; from this
point [the police] were able to observe
plants readily discernible to the naked
eye as marijuana ... .Any member of

the public flying in this airspace who
glanced down could have seen everything
that these offICers observed. On this
record, we readily conclude that
respondent's expectation that his
garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an
expectation that society is prepared to
honor.6
In Dow Chern. Co. 'V. United States,? the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
was investigating the Dow Chemical Company for possible violations of the Clean
Air Act. After having been denied a
request for an on-site inspection, the EPA
obtained aerial photographs of the plant
from an aircraft flying in public navigable
airspace. Dow Chemical alleged that the
photographs taken by the EPA amounted
to a search without a warrant in violation
of the fourth amendment. The Supreme
Court refused to extend protection of the
fourth amendment to the industrial plant
because the plant was not curtilage and the
photographs were taken from public navigable airspace, stating:
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We conclude that the open areas of an
industrial plant complex ... are not
analogous to the "curtilage" of a dwelling for purposes of aerial surveillance;
such an industrial complex is more
comparable to an open field and as
such it is open to the view and observation of persons in aircraft lawfully in
the public airspace immediately above
or sufficiently near the area for the
reach of cameras. B
Based upon the facts present in Riley and
the principles announced in Ciraolo, the
Florida Supreme Court readily determined
that Riley's greenhouse was part of the
curtilage .. However, the Florida court
refused to apply any other principles in
Ciraolo or Dow Chemical to Riley. The
court distinguished the Riley aerial surveillance from that in Ciraolo on the grounds
that Riley involved a helicopter flying at
400 feet rather than a fixed wing aircraft
flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The
court feared that helicopter surveillance
presented a greater threat to privacy and
was more likely to be subject to abuse. The
court reasoned, "Surveillance by helicopter is particularly likely to unreasonably
intrude upon private activities ... because
of a helicopter's virtually unlimited
maneuverability
and
observational
capabilities, helicopter surveillance poses a
serious risk to privacy."9
When presented with the issue of helicopter surveillance in Riley, the United
States Supreme Court held that their
decision in Ciraolo was controlling. By
knowingly exposing the contents of the
greenhouse to public view, Riley waived
any fourth amendment protection. Since a
portion of the roof and sides of the
greenhouse were exposed to public view
from the air, the Court held that Riley
could not reasonably have expected the
contents of the greenhouse to be shielded
from view by police who were flying in a
helicopter where they had a right to be.
That which is knowingly exposed cannot
reasonably be expected to remain private.
A plurality of the Court based their
decision on the fact that the helicopter was
not violating any law or regulation by flying at an altitude of 400 feet over Riley's
property. The Court relied heavily upon
federal rules and regulations which require
that aircraft must at all times maintain an
altitude which allows for emergency landing without undue hazard to persons or
property on the surface in the event of a
power failure. lo The regulations further
establish certain minimum altitudes for
fixed winged aircraft of 1,000 feet above
the highest ground obstacle in congested
areas, II or in other than congested areas, an
altitude of 500 feet above the surface,
except over water or sparsely populated

areas. 12 Helicopters are exempt from
either of the two federally regulated minimum flight altitudes that must be maintained by fixed winged aircraft. I) Given
the unique characteristic of a helicopter to
perform "autorotation" to safely land the
aircraft in the event of a power failure,
such maneuver can be accomplished at
almost any altitude without danger to persons or property below, provided the aircraft has sufficient forward air speed. 14
The extent of the Riley decision is not
unlimited. The Court cautioned that:
We would have a different case if flying at that altitude had been contrary
to law or regulation. But helicopters
are not bound by the lower limits of
the navigable airspace allowed to other
aircraft. Any member of the public
could legally have been flying over
Riley's property in a helicopter at the
altitude of 400 feet and could have
observed Riley's greenhouse. The
police officer did no more. This is not
to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will
always pass muster under the fourth
amendment simply because the plane
is within the navigable airspace specified by lawY

"The court feared
that helicopter
surveillance
presented a
greater threat
to privacy . .. "
The decision is tempered by the facts
that the helicopter was not violating the
law, that helicopter flight at 400 feet is not
a rare occurrence, that there is no evidence
that the helicopter interfered with the normal use of the residence or greenhouse,
and that there was no undue noise, wind,
dust, or threat of injury. A case involving
any of these factors could result in a finding of a constitutional infringement of a
person's expectation of privacy.
Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the
judgment reversing the Florida Supreme
Court, wrote a separate opinion and specifically observed that "the plurality's
approach rests the scope of fourth amendment protection too heavily on compliance with FAA regulations whose purpose
is to promote air safety not to protect

'(t)he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.' (U.S. Const. amend. IV)."16 Justice
O'Connor expanded on her reasoning to
the extent that merely U[b]ecause the FAA
has decided that helicopters can lawfully
operate at virtually any altitude so long as
they pose no safety hazard, it does not follow that the expectations of privacy society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'
simply mirror the FAA's safety concerns."17
Both the plurality Court and Justice
O'Connor appeared to have left open the
door to review future cases involving helicopter observation. Justice O'Connor
noted, U[t]he fact that a helicopter could
conceivably observe the curtilage at virtually any altitude or angle, without violating FAA regulation, does not in itself
mean that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy from such observation."IB
Justice O'Connor's final expression of
concern regarding the holding in this case
was based on a recognition that a person's
expectation of curtilage protection from
naked eye aerial observation was not
unreasonable, per se. In "sufficiently rare"
cases police surveillance from helicopters
from lower altitudes could violate a reasonable expectation of privacy despite
compliance with FAA air safety regulations.
The dissenters in this case, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun (in
a separate dissenting opinion) appeared to
express near disbelief in the legal analysis
of the plurality Court on the helicopter
observation issue. The dissenting Justices
summed up their concerns regarding the
majority decision with a comparison to
George Orwell's dread version of life in
the 1980's:
The black-mustachio'd face gazed
down from every commanding corner.
There was one on the house front
immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said .... In the far distance a
helicopter skimmed down between the
roofs, hovered for an instant like a
bluebottle, and darted away again,
with a curving flight. It was the Police
Patrol, snooping into people's windows. 19
1984 has come and passed. The surveillance conducted in Riley is hardly the
"snooping" feared by Orwell. The dissent
leaves unanswered a simple but critical
question posed to law enforcement: What,
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if anything, should police do if confronted
head-on by evidence of a crime when they
are in a place where they have as much
right to be as any other citizen? The majority recognizes that police need not ignore
what they see from the public realm.
CONCLUSION
The impact of the Riley decision is
bound to be far-reaching. It authorizes law
enforcement officers to gather and utilize
information gained through advanced
technological surveillance techniques
without the necessity of a search warrant.
However, that ability is limited to the
police gaining the information from a public vantage point where they have a right
to be and gathering evidence in a nonintrusive manner. But, as Justice O'Connor
remarked, "[p]ublic roads, even those less
traveled by, are clearly demarked public
thoroughfares."20 And now, aerial surveillance by helicopter, if conducted from a
public thoroughfare, is permissible even
though it is still the road less traveled.
NOTES
I 44 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3079 Qanuary
23, 1989).

State v. Riley, 476 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
J Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1987).
4 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)
5 The Court applied the two-pronged test
announced in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, (1967), to determine whether
governmental activity infringes upon the
constitutional expectation of privacy.
First, an individual must exhibit, by his
conduct, an actual subjective expectation
of privacy; and secondly, society must be
willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable.
6 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
7 Dow, Chern. Co., 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
8 Id. at 229.
9 511 So. 2d at 287.
10 14 CFR §91.79{a).
II 14 CFR §91.79(b).
12 14 CFR §91.79{c).
IJ 14 CFR §91.79{d).
14 Hughes Tool Co., Aircraft Div.,
"Owners' Manual for U.S. Army Primary
Trainer-Hughes Model TH55A," 3-5d,
figure 3-3 (Height Velocity Diagram). The
Hughes TH55 A is the type aircraft used
by the Pasco County, Florida Sheriffs
Office in the instant case. To insure operational safety and to be able to perform a

successful autorotation in an emergency,
varying airspeed! altitude combinations are
required, e.g., 20 kn/400', 40 kn/300', 50
kn/250'.
15 44 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) at 3081.
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20 Id. at 3085.
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